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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MERLYN CLEGG STARLEY, \ 
Defendant and Appellant. l 
CASE 
NO. 19,363 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Defendant was convicted of resisting arrest. Defend-
ant prays for reversal or a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Much of the evidence is conflicting. The State called 
as its witnesses the arresting officer, an officer who was 
summoned to the scene of the arrest, and the accomplice. 
The defendant testified in his own behalf. 
The arresting officer testified that he observed the 
defendant and the accomplice committing an act of sodomy 
ln a parked automobile (Tr. 36). He waited until the au-
2 
tomobile proceeded and then pulled it ov 
er (Tr 40) t 
defendant walked back to the officer's aut · . · 1•• 
omobile ast 
why he was stopped, requested to obtain his ke ' t. 
t th - -1 ~ . . . _ ys, return, o e po ice vehicle where he was placed in th i... · 
e l.liiCk SE' 
and the accomplice was placed in the- front t ·' - ·~ _ sea (Tr· 
47). "."'ithout w~g'._ t~e defendant' Pulled an obj~tjr: 
the officer and sqUirted him with a substance and a SC11/t1 
ensued (Tr. 48). The officer admitted that he was dr' · 
ll'UL 
an unmarked vehicle (Tr. 55) . He also adRii·tt@G u.,~ 
the defendant names (,Tr.- 57). 
The ~ant denied the act of sodomy (Tr. 68\. ~. 
testifie¢. "_:At no time did I hear a siren. No siren 11 , 
sounded. The car next to nre was- untrm'rlted. There 11'• 
no indication of who it· might be, or h0\\t Imf111 people therr 
may have been in this automobile. The driver jum~ 
out in an aggressive manner, came over to my car ani 
grabbed for the door, and- it was not locked, so he pull~ 
it open and at ttlat paiht,.. r. ~ bac~of the sea.t whell 
I had this atomizer of this irritant and squirted him, am 
he averted his face so it caught him on one side and \l'f 
I 
Kriow most" or the rest" (Tr. 64). ffe stated' ttlat he rar-
ried the atomizer for protection, since there llad ~"a' 
series of muggings.in Salt Lake' (Tr. 65). Defendant~ 
never been arrested before (Tr. 63). On cross-examL'IE·, 
tibit det'emant said; "W~; acttta:lly ttle> mooient f. -
my car· and- turned on my lights then he turned m Ill 
J:igftt:s·· and' me white- light rlght ~ of me; ant ~ ~ 
left. It was a stmulttureans- thing: I ttrtnk he· was j1lll 
•ttt· .. i..:..-tac*" I'll trying to· surprise-us; and unnerve us- WI · us.., 
71.')·. . . r,f-
·The acromplke also denied the aet of sodlllY· 
3 
upon the prosecuting attorney proceeded to use a . .state-
ment, allegedly obtained from the witness for the alleged 
purpose of refreshing his memory (Tr. 80). Earlier the 
defendant had testified that this statement had been "wrung 
out of" the accomplice (Tr. 67). The accomplice testified 
that the statement was not true. He stated: "I did not 
give it Mr. Sexton through his own vicious mouth took 
it down. I never once said that what he had written down 
was correct. He wrote it from his own mind . . ." (Tr. 
Sl;, . The court overruled defendant's objection, stating 
~hat the statement "hasn't been offered in evidence" (Tr. 
81). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE STATEMENT WAS 
OBTAINED UNDER DURESS. 
The case of People vs. Hiller, 2 ill. 2nd 323, 118 N.E. 
2d 11, was a prosecution for rape. The Illinois Supreme 
Court held that it was error to permit the prosecution to 
cross-examine from a statement claimed to have been ~ 
tained by coercion, where there was an undetermined 
claim that the prior statements or admissions of a defend-
ant were given under force and duress. 
POINT 2 
TIIE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PRO-
SECUTING ATTORNEY TO IMPEACH HIS OWN WIT-
NEsS UNDER THE GUISE OF REFRESIIlNG HIS MEM-
ORY. 
The case of State vs. Leek, 85 Utah 531 39 p • ' . 2d l()S• 
was a pro:;ecution for forgery Error was · t 
· assigned Wh 
the trial court p2rmitted counsel for the state to. ~ 
t "t ·t · mtenu ga e i s WI nesses by direct and leading questions . 
. . . .d ana rr 
rece1vmg m ev1 ence a written statement purp·ort d · · e to have 
been made and sworn to by the witness and for th e pur. 
pose of impeachment of him. 
This Court held that there must be a showing th&! 
counsel has been misled or entrapped. Here there was nr 
such showing and a new trial was ordered. 
The Supreme Court reasoned: 
"Here the imp2aching document was especial1'. 
damaging as the very thing sought to be establishej 
by the document was corroboration of the acccmplice 
requiring direct evidence, which was sought to be se-
cured by way of impeaching one's own witne3s. The 
fact that the witness stated out of court, certain mat· 
ters which, if competent proof, would tend to show 
the defendant's guilt, do2s not establish the existenll' 
of such matters as facts. After counsel, and for thz! 1 
matter the court, had discovered that the witness waE 
not inclined to help the cause of the state, or did not 
intend to testify to anything adverse to defendant> , 
cause, it was improper for the District Attorney to 
pursue the examination and thereby secure affinna· 
tive testimony prejudicial to the state and then make : 
use of the situation thus created for the p\ll'POO' o! 
securing by impeachment affirmative testimony favor· 
able to his cause by showing that the witness had made · 
statements out of court and out of the presence of .th'. . diCI~ 
defendant, although written, which were preJU 
to her." P. 1095, 1096. 
In State vs. Herrera, 8 Utah 2d 188, 330 P. 2d lOSli. 
5 
the defendant was prosecuted for rape. The prosecuting 
attorney repeatedly cross-examined the defense witness rel-
ative to certain charges and arrests, as he thumbed through 
same papers. No official records were offered to substan-
tiate the implicacions arising from them nor was the dis-
position of any charges or arrests given. 
In reversing and remanding the case, this Court stated: 
"If the line of cross-examination indulged here were 
to \:::~ permitted., the accused would find himself in a 
wilderness without witnesses, since none would volun-
teer the truth nor would the truth flow free under 
compulsory process, a witnese knowing the extent to 
which he could be subjected to questions not pertinent 
to the issu2s involved, but designed to destroy his ver-
actiy by the simple device of calling attention to a ser-
ies of incidents in his past life, perhaps harmless per 
so, p2rhaps true but having nothing to do with his 
truthfulness or the lack of it." P. 1087. 
The Court wmt on to point to another ground which 
constitutfd prejudicial erroT: 
"The same sort of objection to such procedure can 
be levelled at the attempted impeachment of the ~ 
cution's own witness. a physician, who testified that he 
saw no evidence of abrasions on the limbs of the pro-
secutrix, only to be called to account by the prosectI-
tion through questions implying that he had made an 
official report to the contrary, thus casting the doctor 
in the role of prevaricatOT-\\ithout offering W intro-
duce such report of evidence (which was ava.ila.ble)". 
P. 1087. Emphasis added by the Court. · 
In People vs. Zammora, 66 Cal. App.2d 166, 152 P.2d 
180, 1944. a prosecution for homicide, the court found error 
6 
in permitting the District Attorney while examinin 
f h . g a11'1. ness or t e state, to call the witness' attention t · 
. . otheorr 
c1al transcn.pt of the Grand Jury and proceeded 
. . to rea1 
therefrom, it appearmg from the line of que ti 
s ons P't· 
pounded that the District Attorney was not attem tin·. 
. . . p gt,. 
reconcile a variance with former testimony or to relrei 
an absent recollection, but rather to impeach the witne£: 
The court stated: 
"If the purpose of the examination is to reconcile 
or examine testimony, the memory of the witness ma· 
be refreshed, but if it is to contradict or discredit lli~ 
present testimony of the witness and to have the l'On· 
tradiction stand unreconciled and unexplainro, then ;1 
is impeachment, and a pretense of refreshing the mem. 
ory by reading former testimony can not be made a 
subterfuge to get before the jury incompetent e~. 
dence or statements which aid the case of the pro;e. 
cution." P. 206. 
POINT 3 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE PRO· 
SECUTING ATTORNEY TO ASK QUESTIONS RELAT-
ING TO CRIMES NOT IN ISSUE. 
Sta~ vs. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407, 196'.: 
was a prosecution for assault with intent to commit mur· 
der and robbery. Defendant had made statements to an 
· carcerated 
F. B. I. agent after he had been arrested and m . 'bl· 
but for other crimes. The only pertinent, and admiSSJ e, 
th t he ·vas 
statement by the defendant to the agent was a ' 
• ti" of the defense, 
an accessory to the fact. Over obJeC ons ti!' 
. . f the agent the en ~ 
the prosecuting attorney ehc1ted rom · 
7 
conversations he had with the defendant, which included 
questions relating to various crimes. 
The court held this to be prejudicial error. "It im-
plied that the defendant was implicated in other crimes, 
none of them proven, and could have no other effect than 
to degrade the defendant and give to the jury the impres-
sion that he had a propensity for crime." P. 409. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant was tried for the crime of resisting ar-
rest. The record shows, however, that in fact the de-
fendant was prosecuted for sodorey. Without claiming 
surprise the state was permitted to impeach its own wit-
ness by a statement obtained under duress, not for the 
purpose of proving the charge of resisting arrest but to 
establish that the infamous crime against nature had been 
committed. This created an unfavorable and prejudicial 
image of the defendant before the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVE McMULLIN 
20 East Utah Ave. 
Payson, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
